Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain by Applegate, John S.
Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law 
Volume 13 
Issue 2 Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law, Volume 13, Issue 2 
Article 4 
January 1998 
Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental Justice: 
Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain 
John S. Applegate 
Indiana University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel 
 Part of the Land Use Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Applegate, John S. (1998) "Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental Justice: Evaluating the 
Brownfields Bargain," Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol13/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
RISK ASSESSMENT, REDEVELOPMENT, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING THE
BROWNFIELDS BARGAIN
JOHN S. APPLEGATE*
Brownfields initiatives offer environmental law an opportunity
to break out of its usual-and usually very appropriate-role as a
constraint on industrial activity, and instead to facilitate the
redevelopment of abandoned urban industrial infrastructure and the
revitalization of the surrounding communities. Inner cities have
decayed as their industries have moved out of the city and into the
suburbs, leaving behind a wasteland of abandoned factories and
warehouses, environmental degradation, and poverty. Environmental
regulation has, in truth, little to do with the original abandonment of
urban industrial areas, but it can have a lot to do with the attractiveness
of redeveloping them. The environmental remediation obligations that
flow from ownership of contaminated property impose serious potential
liability on prospective developers.
Specifically, the broad liability and the stringent clean-up
requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act' (CERCLA or Superfund), and to a
Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. This article is
based on a presentation at the University of Kentucky Journal of Natural Resources and
Environmental Law 1998 Symposium on Brownfields. I am grateful to the Journal and to
Professor Michael Healy for the invitation to explore this subject in some detail, and to the
participants in the Symposium, particularly William Buzbee, Kirsten Engel, and Wendy Wagner,
for many helpful comments and insights. Amanda Prebble provided invaluable research
assistance.
'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
Numerically, most brownfields sites will never by addressed by CERCLA, because they
are too small to be included on the National Priorities List, and instead are subject to state
environmental clean-up, voluntary clean-up, or other environmental laws. Kris Wemstedt &
Robert Hersh, "Through a Lens Darkly"-Superfund Spectacles on Public Participation at
Brownfield Sites, 9 RiSK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 153, 156 (Spring 1998). This does not
change the analysis in this article for a number of reasons. First, placement on the NPL is not a
prerequisite to CERCLA liability-there is no lower threshold of liability-so the threat of
CERCLA liability does not disappear. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,
720 (2d Cir. 1993). Second, to the extent that state clean-up laws are not also voluntary clean-up
or brownfields redevelopment laws, state laws impose the same threat of liability as CERCLA.
Third, state voluntary clean-up and brownfields laws tend to emphasize site-specific risk
assessment more even than CERCLA does, so risk assessment has a more prominent place. The
state role is thoroughly considered in William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental
Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POE'Y REV. 1, 29-66
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lesser extent the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act2 (RCRA),
make reuse of such property a risky venture because it is usually
contaminated to a greater or lesser degree with hazardous substances.3
To the extent that these statutes present a serious obstacle to
redevelopment, the relaxation of their clean-up requirements can
substantially aid in revitalization efforts.
The exchange, which I call the Brownfields Bargain, between
moderated clean-up requirements and economic development is the
essence of brownfields initiatives. Many view some relaxation of
already strict environmental standards as a small price to pay for urban
revitalization, and so brownfields initiatives are supported not only by
potential redevelopers, but also by the Environmental Protection
Agency4 (EPA), numerous states,5 and proposed federal legislation.6 To
be a fair exchange, a bargain must at a minimum exhibit some
symmetry between benefits and burdens, and it must be understood by
its participants. Just as risk assessment is one of the key tools for
relaxing clean-up requirements, it can also be a tool for ensuring that
the terms of the Brownfields Bargain are fair.7
(1997); William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Approvals,
Incentives, and the Costs ofIndeterminate Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 35, 100-116 (1995).
' Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994)
[hereinafter RCRA]. See generally Susan E. Bromm, Life After RCRA-It 's More Than a
Brownfields Dream, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10031 (1998) (describing application of
RCRA to brownfields).
'The law applicable to brownfields redevelopment is thoroughly reviewed in Wendy
E. Wagner, Overview of Federal and State Law Governing Brownfields Cleanups, in
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 15-40
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE].
4 See A] Gore, Preface, to BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at
xix-xx (endorsing brownfields redevelopment). The United States Environmental Protection
Agency's policy on its Brownfields Initiative is "to empower States, communities, and other
stakeholders in economic redevelopment to work together in a timely manner to prevent, assess,
safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields." 62 Fed. Reg. 52,720 (1997) (also available
electronically at <www.epa.gov/fedrgstrfEPA-WASTE/1997/0ctoberlDay-09/f26863.htm>)
[hereinafter EPA Policy on Brownfields Initiative].
'State brownfields legislation is collected in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE,
supra note 3 , at 287-681, and Larry Schnapf, State-by-State Survey of Brownfield and Voluntary
Cleanup Programs, 28 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 2488 (March 7,1998); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-97-66, SUPERFUND: STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS PROVIDE INCENTIVES TO
ENCOURAGE CLEANUPS (April 1997); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY, STATE OF THE STATES
ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES (1995).
6 These initiatives are described in Wemstedt & Hersh, supra note I, at 158-59.
"Market outcomes are fair and should not be disturbed if, and only ift local
communities are empowered to obtain relevant information, participate in the pertinent regulatory
processes, and bargain effectively with developers." Seth D. Jaffe, The Market's Response to
Environmental Inequity: We have the Solution; What's the Problem, 14 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 655, 660
244 [VOL. 13:2
EVALUATING THE BROWNFIELDS BARGAIN
This Article critically describes the role of risk assessment in
brownfields redevelopment initiatives. Part I identifies the risk
regulation issues in brownfields redevelopment. There are, in fact,
several ways to modify environmental liabilities to encourage
redevelopment, and risk assessment relates primarily to one of them-
relaxing clean-up requirements through recalculation of the risks posed
by the site now and in the future. The Article does not dispute the
claim that a relaxation of environmental requirements is an important
tool of urban redevelopment or that the benefits of urban redevelopment
are worth some such relaxation. Given the high degree of stringency of
the otherwise applicable standards and the real human suffering that
results from urban decay, the claims are probably true in many, though
certainly not all, cases. However, it is critical to understand just how
risk assessment affects and does not affect remediation and
redevelopment decisions.
Part II reviews the methods of risk assessment and their role in
brownfields redevelopment. Risk calculations are highly dependent on
assumptions about present and future exposures to hazardous
contamination, introducing several important difficulties into the
standard analysis. Brownfields sites must be recognized as particular
places with particular histories and futures. The relationship of a
former industrial site to its neighbors and predictions as to its future are
central to any brownfields risk analysis. As in Part I, my objective is
not only to describe the relationship between brownfields and risk
assessment, but also to clear away the rhetoric that surrounds
brownfields initiatives and the role of risk assessment therein. While
there is much to be said for brownfields redevelopment and much to be
said for modifying risk assessment practices that unnecessarily hinder
redevelopment, we must also be candid that the intended effect of these
initiatives is to reduce risk estimates without changing the underlying
conditions.
Part I examines the principal modifications of risk assessment
practice that have been proposed to facilitate brownfields
redevelopment. If risk assessments are unduly conservative, they
unnecessarily burden redevelopment without materially advancing the
protection of human health and the environment. Thus, brownfields
proposals seek to make risk estimates more "accurate," in the sense of
predicting more precisely the future activities at a brownfields site and
assessing the risks posed under those circumstances. In the brownfields
(1995).
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context, this involves the assumption that the site will adopt an
industrial or commercial use (i.e., be economically revitalized), either
of which presents relatively low risks from residual contamination. The
Article also reviews proposals to adopt more realistic default
assumptions generally, to avoid worst-case point estimates, to predict
or prescribe the future use of the site, and to adopt comparative risk
methods.
Since brownfields redevelopment exchanges strict
environmental protection for economic development, recalculation of
risks to achieve lower clean-up expenses must be approached with
caution. Part IV, therefore, concludes the Article with a number of
important caveats concerning reliance on more forgiving risk
calculations. Reliance on predictions of a site's future is only justified
if there is some assurance that the predictions will be realized in the
short term and maintained in the long term. No matter how worthy the
aspirations for brownfields redevelopment, we must not forget that even
the best risk assessors have a clouded crystal ball for predicting the
future, and CERCLA's overriding purpose is not economic
development but protecting human health and the environment. From
this perspective, risk assessment's appropriate role in brownfields
redevelopment is to illuminate the real terms of the Brownfields
Bargain, so that brownfields decisions are made with full knowledge of
their likely consequences.
1. DEFINING THE ISSUES
A. Brownfields and the Role of CERCLA
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) broadly defines
brownfields as "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and
commercial sites where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by
real or perceived environmental contamination...... As such, the United
States offers a virtually unlimited supply9 of brownfields whose
redevelopment is, at least in most cases, a worthy governmental
objective. It is especially appealing in what might be called the core or
paradigm meaning ofbrownfields, that is, economically disadvantaged
urban areas, often with large minority populations, whose revitalization
'U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BASIC BROWNFIELDS FACT SHEET (1995).
'Estimates range from 130,000 to450,000 such sites. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-95-172, REUSE OF URBAN INDUSTRIAL SITES (1995) (citation omitted).
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is one of the great challenges of urban management." The quoted
definition is, obviously, much broader than urban redevelopment, but
a glance at official justifications makes it clear that decayed urban areas
are the central concern and are regarded as the best case for
encouraging redevelopment." Just as Love Canal, with its tableau of
irresponsible dumping and innocent victims (school children),
dominates thinking about Superfund, brownfields call to mind
abandoned factories and warehouses in city centers.'
2 They no longer
provide the economic lifeblood of the community but, abandoned,
symbolize the hazards and hopelessness of the inner city. The core
brownfields idea, therefore, is that the redevelopment of these
abandoned industrial areas would greatly improve, on balance, the lives
of those who live near them, 3 and, consequently, that all reasonable
efforts should be made to facilitate such redevelopment. Limiting
prospective redevelopers' liability for existing environmental
contamination is one way to facilitate redevelopment.
The role of environmental regulation in creating brownfields in
the first place is uncertain and probably minimal. 4 The movement
10 Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment:
Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 705 (1994); E. Lynn Grayson
& Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon: An Analysis ofEnvironmental, Economic,
and Community Concerns, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10337 (1995); see also ROBERT D.
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXE: RACE, CLAss AND ENvIRONMENTAL QUALITY 31-33 (1990).
"See Gore, supra note 4, at xix-xx; EPA Policy on Brownfields Initiative, supra note
4.
2 The toxic soup at Love Canal informed Congress' passage of CERCLA and the
federal courts' initial interpretation of the statute in cases like United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.
572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (determining the scope of liability under CERCLA to include
joint and several liability); and United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding
that joint and several liability should be imposed upon defendants found to be responsible for
creation of hazardous waste under CERCLA). See Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in
Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable? 92 Nw. U.
L. REv.706, 708 (1998).
" This picture is crudely drawn, but it is not a caricature. Industrial development is not
an unalloyed good, since it can bring pollution and traffic. Some environmental justice advocates
object to brownfields redevelopment, since it means that inner city communities are condemned
to living in an essentially urban area rather than a residential one. See Kirsten Engel, Brownfields
Initiatives and the Requirements of Market-Based, Rights-Based, and Pragmatic Conceptions of
Environmental Justice, Unpublished Topical Outline, Journal of Natural Resources and
Environmental Law 1998 Symposium on Browfields [hereinafter Symposium on Brownfields]
(on file with Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law); McWilliams, supra note 10
at 705-783; Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding
Public Participation in the Federal Superiind Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 671 (1994); see
also Wemstedt & Hersh, supra note 1, at 160, 165-67 (describing negative effects of
redevelopment).
"4 Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution ofBrownfields, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. REV. 265,273 (1997); Buzbee, supra note 1, at 5-11.
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away from the city centers in the first place began long before liability
for environmental clean-up was even imagined, and this migration had
to do with the availability of automobile transportation, the attractions
of the suburbs, post-war increases in real earnings, and patterns of de
jure and de facto racial segregation.'" Therefore, simply modifying
environmental liability itself cannot bring the industry back. Other
incentives-tax abatements, worker training, better schools, and the
like-must carry that positive burden.' 6 Moreover, redevelopment is
only likely to occur where other conditions, such as a convenient
location, are favorable.' 7 Nevertheless, environmental liability does
have a supporting role to play in revitalization, if only because it is an
obstacle that can be removed to facilitate redevelopment.
It has been observed for some time that the environmental
clean-up requirements of CERCLA and RCRA encourage prospective
developers to eschew existing industrial land in city centers in favor of
non-industrial (typically agricultural) land at the periphery."
Environmental liability attaches to purchasers of and lenders to 9
contaminated property. Unless the purchaser can demonstrate that it is
an "innocent landowner"2 or that the contamination was caused solely
by an unrelated third party,2' it is regarded as a "present owner" of the
property who is responsible, retroactively, for all of the costs of
s Existing patterns change slowly because it is harder for people of color and poor
people to move. ROBERT D. BULLARD, INVISIBLE HOUSTON: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN BOOM
AND BUST 61 (1987).
16 For example, liability waivers, no action agreements, cleanup tax credits, and
immunity for state voluntary cleanups. See Wendy E. Wagner, Overview of the Law of
Brownfields, Symposium on Brownfields (1998); Kathleen M. Martin, Siting on Contaminated
Property: Development and Cleanup through Public/Private Cooperation, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 20-23, 53-54.
See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 1, at 168-69.
"See JAMES BOYD ET AL., THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ON
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 28-39
(1994). See also McWilliams, supra note 10, at 714-732. But see Abrams, supra note 14, at 278-
292 (exploring comparative cost-benefit analysis based on the cost of land, taxes, demolition and
removal of debris, the likelihood of zoning approvals, etc., Abrams suggests that regardless of
liability under CERCLA, greenfields still possess an economic advantage).
" See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11 th Circ. 1990), cert
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (imposing liability on banks that did not foreclose on property "if
its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference
that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose"). But see Pub. L. No. 104-
208, Div. A, Title 11, § 2501, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (excluding certain lenders from liability);
William W. Buzbee, CERCLA 's New Safe Harbors for Bankers, Lenders, and Fiduciaries, 26
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envi. L. Inst.) 10656 (1996) (describing new statutory provisions).
'0 CERCLA § 101(35)(A)-(C).
2 Id. § 107(b)(3).
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cleaning it up,22 regardless of fault, and regardless of its extent of
contribution to the problem. 23 Even if the purchaser believes that it can
establish innocent landowner status or the third-party causation defense,
neither is certain-there are no "safe harbors" in CERCLA
24 _-and both
must be litigated. Moreover, once the owner knows of the
contamination, it must take "reasonable precautions" with the
hazardous materials.25 Whatever precisely "reasonable precautions"
means,26 it cannot be determined definitely in advance of cost recovery
litigation, and it may well involve undertaking clean-up oneself. Put
bluntly, even if one is an innocent purchaser and could obtain recovery
of the clean-up costs from others, who needs the headache? It is much
easier to use land that has never had an industrial use. This incentive
system helps to perpetuate the doughnut shape of economic
development in many American cities. The reduction of CERCLA
liability, therefore, can make redevelopment of the urban core more
attractive by reducing the disincentive to using these urban industrial
lands.
B. The Role of Risk Assessment in Reducing the CERCLA
Disincentive
The CERCLA disincentive to redevelopment could be
ameliorated, in the first place, by reducing the scope of the liability that
frightens off would-be developers.27 Adoption of prospective-only
liability, a fault-based system, or several-only liability would reduce the
potential liability of prospective owners, as would expansion of the
221 Id. § 107(a)(1), (4)(A)-(D).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d. 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that while Congress
intended to impose liability on responsible parties irrespective of fault, defendant could escape
strict liability through use of third-party defense).
24 Buzbee, supra note 1, at 42-54.
25 This is an explicit requirement of the innocent landowner and third-party defenses.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3)(a).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1403-1411
(D.N.H. 1985) (holding that in light of the inherently dangerous activity of the transport and
processing of hazardous waste and the ease with which the defendant could determine that a risk
to others was involved, by not insuring that their waste was processed properly, the defendants did
not take "reasonable precautions" against foreseeable acts or omissions nor exercise reasonable
care).
27 This and other potential reforms of CERCLA to encourage brownfields
redevelopment are helpfully surveyed in Frona M. Powell, Amending CERCLA to Encourage the
Redevelopment of Brownfields: Issues, Concerns, and Recommendations, 53 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 113 (1998).
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
innocent-purchaser and third-party defenses. There is some indication
that courts are already doing this, though for reasons other than
encouraging brownfields redevelopment.2" Such reforms seem unlikely
to be widely adopted, however, because they are not specific to
brownfields, where the arguments for relaxing stringency are strongest,
and such reforms would be perceived as a general weakening of
CERCLA. The Brownfields Bargain applies to the specific situation in
which the benefits of economic redevelopment in the inner city
outweigh the reduced protection of health and safety. Therefore,
brownfields per se cannot justify such fundamental changes in a
polluter-pays liability system that enjoys widespread support.
The CERCLA disincentive could also be reduced by requiring
less clean-up activity by an otherwise responsible party. The stricter
the clean-up standards, the higher the clean-up costs. To give a
simplified example, if a concentration of 1 part per million (ppm) of a
hazardous contaminant in soil correlates to 1 x 10' excess cancer risk
to those who are exposed to the soil, and 1 x 10' is the clean-up target
for residual risk, then all soil that is contaminated above 1 ppm (say,
1,000,000 cubic meters (in3) of soil, in all) must be removed, at great
expense. If 10 ppm correlates to a 1 x 10 risk, however, one could
decide to reduce risk only to that level and accordingly only remove soil
above 10 ppm (say, 100,000 in3) at considerably less expense. And so
on-if a 1 x 10' residual risk is acceptable, then only 100,000 m3 of
contaminated soil needs to be removed. Reducing the stringency of
CERCLA's target or residual risk level would in this way reduce clean-
up costs, which would in turn reduce the disincentive to redevelopment.
CERCLA's stringency could be reduced in two ways. The first
is to change the substantive legal or regulatory standards29 themselves.
The statutory criteria for clean-up,30 as translated in the National
'See, e.g., Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396(5th Cir. 1997) (holding
that response action must be "justified" by the extent of the release); United States v. Cello-Foil
Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996) (requiring intent to dispose as a prerequisite to arranger
liability); In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993) (easing defendant's burden
of proving severability of contamination).
2 Throughout the article, I use clean-up standards to refer to legal descriptions of what
must be done. "Protective of human health and the environment" and even I x I 0' to 1 x 106 are
legal standards that must be met. This is to be distinguished from requirements or stringency,
which refer to the amount of actual clean-up effort that must occur, for example, how many cubic
meters of dirt must be removed and treated. Depending on how compliance is calculated, the same
legal standard may be more or less stringent and require more or less clean-up activity and
expenditure.
3- 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (b),(d)(1994).
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Contingency Plan,3' require EPA to evaluate the conditions prevailing
at each specific site according to nine criteria in three tiers:
- Two threshold criteria- "overall protection of human health
and environment," and "applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements" (ARARs) of other federal and state laws-must
be met in all cases. Overall protectiveness is a risk-based
criterion, and EPA interprets it to require a residual risk within
the range of I x 10- to l x 10- excess individual risk of
cancer. (Harm to the non-human "environment" is also
considered, but it tends to be less important, in part because the
tools for measuring it are quite crude.) Importantly, this means
that "clean-up" does not result in a site that is totally clean in
the sense of risk-free or returned to its pre-industrial, "pristine"
condition. Rather, as in virtually all toxics statutes, it
anticipates the continued existence of a measurable residual
risk. Accordingly, in considering the relaxation of clean-up
standards, the question is not whether any risk should remain,
but how great the remaining risk should be.
ARARs were designed to achieve some uniformity of
treatment between Superfund and non-Superfund sites and to
provide specific guidance for clean-up levels where it is
available in other regulatory schemes. The most important
sources of ARARs are RCRA and the Safe Drinking Water
Act, which govern hazardous waste disposal and groundwater
remediation, respectively. The application of these standards
is often criticized (quite apart from brownfields issues) as too
strict or as inapplicable to abandoned properties. Achievement
of drinking water standards is claimed to be unnecessary if the
contaminated groundwater is not potable or is otherwise highly
unlikely to be used for drinking purposes. It also contributes
to a high level of uncertainty in predicting the applicable
standards.34 ARARs may be waived if they are unachievable
and the risk-based protectiveness standard can be met.
"40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1997).
"See id. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2).
"Alex S. Karlin, How Long is Clean?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1994, at
7,48; Elizabeth H. Temkin, Cleaning UpARARs: Reflections From the Field, NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T, winter 1992, at 18,51.
14 Buzbee, supra note 1, at 59-61.
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- Balancing criteria, the second tier, may be traded-off against
each other. The balancing criteria include the long-term
effectiveness or permanence of the remedy; the reduction of
toxicity, mobility, or volume of contamination through the use
of treatment; the short-term effectiveness, which is an awkward
way of describing the risks of the remedial activities
themselves; the ease of implementation of the remedy, that is,
its technical and administrative feasibility; and the capital and
operational costs of the remedy, specifically the cost-
effectiveness of the selected remedy in relation to alternative
remedies. The balancing criteria demonstrate a continuing and
indeed overriding concern to address the long-term effects of
environmental contamination. While long-term effectiveness
and permanent treatment are apparently equal balancing
criteria, the statute includes clear preferences for remedies that
emphasize them.35 This reflects, of course, a desire to
minimize risks to future generations by "fixing" the problem
once and for all-an entirely reasonable policy, but (like 1 x
1 0' and ARARs) a costly one.
- Modifying criteria, state (governmental) acceptance and
community (general public) acceptance, may alter the remedy
indicated by the above. They are of distinctly lesser
importance, coming into play after a preferred remedy has been
selected. These criteria, as the name suggests, receive little
weight in remedy selection,36 and so they have little effect on
cost. However, their potential impact is sufficient to have
driven at least one state (Ohio) to develop a secretive
brownfields process that avoids public pressure for
stringency."
Taken together, these criteria are quite stringent, though they could be
modified to be less strict, which would make liability less expensive.
Relaxation of CERCLA's standards for redevelopment cases would be
in accordance with the Brownfields Bargain, and it would have the
" RCRA mirrors this approach to managing hazardous waste by requiring treatment
to specified standards before certain materials can be disposed on land. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6924(m)(1994).
36 John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards
in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L. J. 903, 912-13 (1998).
" See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746 (Banks-Baldwin 1995), discussed in J. Jeffrey
MeNealey, Brownfields Development in Ohio, Symposium on Brownfields (on file with Journal
of Natural Resources and Environmental Law).
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virtue of candor by making an explicit trade-off between environmental
protection and economic development. It would also have the
drawback of candor, of course, by acknowledging a willingness to be
less than totally protective, which Congress usually tries to avoid in an
effort to be all things to all people.3" It is significant in this connection
that the Pennsylvania brownfields statute emphasizes that the legal
standards for clean-up do not change for brownfields, even though the
statute also clearly anticipates changing the amount of remediation
activity that is actually required.39
If the legal standards do not change, though, how can one
reduce the stringency of CERCLA to make clean-up less burdensome
and redevelopment more attractive? The second way is to modify the
way that the standard is calculated. If the risk calculation is
unnecessarily high, then the clean-up will be unnecessarily expensive,
and the CERCLA disincentive unnecessarily disheartening. Here (at
last) is the role of risk assessment. The higher the assessed risk, the
more likely that clean-up activities will be required and the more
intensive and expensive the activities will be. Conversely, lower risk
estimates will result in less extensive clean-up activities, and hence a
more attractive economic prospect for redevelopment.
Risk assessment is the principal method for measuring
compliance with CERCLA because risk levels are the ultimate
substantive standard under the statute. The degree of clean-up is, in
effect, a fine-tuned risk determination. As is described in Part II, risk
assessment is a highly inexact science. Many assumptions go into it,
and many uncertainties remain. There are thus many choices to be
made in risk calculations, and those choices need not be made with the
aim of showing the worst-case risk estimate. The type of brownfields
initiative that concerns this Article, therefore, is the modification of
environmental clean-up requirements by recalculating the risks in a way
that lowers the risks.
Such recalculations are not necessarily dishonest (cooking the
books), nor is the exchange that they support (the Brownfields Bargain)
inherently wrong. The clean-up requirements of federal environmental
" See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 233
(1990); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean AirAct, 30
UCLA L. REv. 740, 742-56 (1983); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (1995).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 §§ 6026.101-6026.908 (1995); Denise K. Chamberlain,
Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Program, Symposium on Brownfields (on file with Journal of
Natural Resources and Environmental Law).
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laws are quite stringent, so it may well be that the marginal
environmental protection is so dearly bought with so little additional
benefit that it is hardly worth the extra expense." When positive
benefits like redevelopment are added to the balance, insisting on the
highest degree of stringency may make little sense. Alternatively, it
may be that employing and making health care available to the inner
city poor actually improves life expectancies far more than residual
contamination reduces them.41 In either event, however, it is an
exchange. As such, the terms of the exchange (e.g., additional risk, jobs
created, health care made available) should be clear to those who are
affected and those making the decisions. At a minimum, the identities
of the groups who are benefitted and those placed at risk should be
known in advance. In the brownfields context, therefore, risk
assessment should not only be a tool for relaxing clean-up requirements,
but also a tool for determining the real terms of the Brownfields
Bargain in a given case.
II. BROWNFIELDS RISK ASSESSMENT
A. Application of the "Red Book" Paradigm
Risk assessment has become the cornerstone of EPA's
regulation of hazardous materials.42 As its name suggests, risk
assessment is a process for calculating the probability of certain malign
effects-typically, excess deaths from cancer in humans-caused by
exposure to the chemical (or radiological) agent of concern. The
methodology can be used both to determine whether an activity
involving the chemical or a place contaminated by the chemical
requires regulatory attention and to determine how much and what
' The tendency to insist that we go to the logical extreme or chase the "last ten percent"
in environmental regulation has been attributed to bureaucratic tunnel vision. See STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 10-19(1993)
(criticizing regulatory agencies for promulgating arduous standards that result in high costs and
low benefits ), and to American legal culture generally, see Gerrard, supra note 12, at 741.
41 See, e.g., RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) [hereinafter RISK VERSUS
RISK]; BREYER, supra note 40; COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: TOOLS FOR SETTING
GOVERNMENT PRIoRTIEs (J. Clarence Davies ed., 1996).
2 See generally John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in ltsef: The Role of
Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1643 (1995). This is not
uncontroversial, see, e.g., Donald T. Homstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 (1992), but risk is well
established.
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types of actions should be taken. The latter is most relevant to
CERCLA remedy selection, and it is our particular interest here.
The general methodology for risk assessment was set out in the
1983 "Red Book" published by the National Academy of Sciences, Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process.
43 The
Red Book distinguished between risk management and risk assessment.
Risk management is the process of deciding what to do about a risk that
has already been identified and characterized. CERCLA's legal
standards, for instance, state how the risks of Superfund sites are to be
managed, and the Brownfields Bargain is a refinement of risk
management. Risk assessment, in contrast, is the predicate calculation
of risk on which management decisions are based. The distinction
between risk assessment and management has been enthusiastically
embraced by those who advocate more "science-based" environmental
regulation, because the descriptive phase is seen to be a politically
neutral process"-just the facts," so to speak-in contrast to the
management phase in which policies and political choices naturally
predominate. The argument is made, for example, that it is entirely
appropriate under the rubric of risk management to decide that a
substantial margin of safety should be built into the ultimate standard
to cover errors or uncertainties in the assessment or unanticipated
occurrences. The assessment phase, in contrast, should simply make
the best guesses possible.4" Critics of the Red Book's quantitative risk
" For general works on risk assessment, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983) (the "Red Book");
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1994);
PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, RISK
ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING (1997) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAI/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N]. EPA's guidance on applying risk assessment in the
Superfund context is the multi-part U.S. EPA, RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUPERFUND:
HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL, OSWER 9285.7-01C (Dec. 1991).
For a good introduction to risk assessment in the brownfields context, as well as a host
of other brownfields issues, see BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3.
" See, e.g., RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 41, at 260; BREYER, supra note 40, at 9-10;
H.R. 9, 104th Cong.(1995).
" See Steven Milloy, Forward, to REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS PROJECT, INC.,
CHOICES IN RISK ASSESSMENT : THE ROLE OF SCIENCE POLICY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
MANAGEMENT PROCESS, REGULATORYIMPACT ANALYSIS PROJECT, INC. i, xiii (1994) (cataloging
the assumptions in risk assessment).
One could debate the allocation endlessly. EPA takes the position, and it is at least a
plausible one, that uncertainties are part of the assessment process, and so it is appropriate to fill
gaps there with policy-based assumptions. A similar point was raised in Lead Industries Ass'n,
Inc. v. EPA. The association argued that the "margin of safety" language in the Clean Air Act
required EPA to add one and only one margin of safety at the end of its calculations; EPA believed
that it could add a margin of safety, often in the form of conservative assumptions, at each step of
the assessment process. The court upheld EPA's position. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
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assessment paradigm, on the other hand, have pointed out that many
policy decisions are implicit in the assessment process, most of which
take the form of assumptions to fill data gaps, and that they are
unavoidable. 6 In the face of uncertainty, therefore, it is appropriate to
build margins of safety into the assessment phase. The current state of
the art, reflected in two recent blue-ribbon panel reports on risk
assessment,4 7 maintains the assessment-management distinction but
communicates explicitly the use and choice of assumptions in the
assessment phase.
Despite the assessment-management debate, to which we will
return, the Red Book's structure for risk assessment has proven quite
durable and is the basic model used today. Risk, for these purposes, is
the product of the toxic potency of a hazardous material and the amount
of exposure to it. The two variables, toxicity and exposure, control the
result equally, so that a reduction or increase in either has the
corresponding effect on the resulting risk. Consequently, risk reduction
can be achieved either by reducing the toxicity of the chemical, for
example by treating hazardous material to minimize its potency through
chemical change or by dilution,48 or by reducing exposure to the
material, either by isolating it or by treating it in a way that renders it
less mobile in the environment. 9 In some situations, reduction of
toxicity is quite feasible, so some form of treatment will tend to have
the greatest potential for risk reduction. 0 Such treatment also tends to
have permanent effects, hence the CERCLA preference for treatment.5 1
In other cases, exposure control will be the more or the only practicable
step, for example, with elemental or other materials that cannot be
1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Homstein, supra note 42, at 565-575; Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice
Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, I U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 115 (1996). See Adam M.
Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 325, 330, 335-338
(1996). 7 
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING RISK];
PRESIDENTIALICONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, RISK
ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING (1997).
'Dilution is not a favored form oftreatment of hazardous wastes. See EPA, Proposed
Hazardous Waste Identification Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 21450 (requiring that for "successful
implementation of the land disposal restrictions..., dilution be prohibited as a partial or complete
substitute for adequate treatment of [hazardous] wastes" ).
9 Cf. RCRA § 3004(m) (treatment standards); CERCLA § 121 (b) ("treatment to reduce
toxicity, mobility").
"' This is the position implicitly taken by the "land ban" for hazardous wastes, RCRA
§ 3004(d)-(g), which requires treatment of such wastes before they are placed in a disposal facility,
the theory being that such materials cannot effectively be isolated forever.
"' CERCLA § 121(b)(1); RCRA § 3004(d)-(g).
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destroyed. A familiar example is asbestos in homes: the risk of
removal is sufficiently high that often it is best simply to isolate it, thus
eliminating the exposure side of the risk equation. While one may have
reservations about the actual efficacy of either toxicity reduction
techniques or exposure reduction techniques, in principle either is an
effective and appropriate way to reduce risk.
The Red Book divided the risk assessment process (toxicity x
exposure) into four steps. The first is hazard identification. For
Superfund purposes, this involves detecting the presence of
contaminants at a site and determining whether they are toxic at all.
The principal issue is determining the location and volumes of the
contaminants of concern, as there are few commonly found
contaminants whose essential properties are unknown. The second half
of the toxicity determination is dose response, which involves
determining the potency of the identified substances. This is a major
source of uncertainty in risk assessment, as definitive studies of the
long-term effects of chemicals are very rare.52 Rather, assessment of
potency usually relies on extrapolations from high doses to low doses
because low-dose effects would be too hard to distinguish from
background incidence;53  from animals to humans, because
epidemiological studies are expensive and difficult to control;
4 and
from chemical to related chemical where data are limited.5" The
potency determination also needs to distinguish among different risk
receptors, as in the case of lead, where children are at a far higher risk
than adults.56
Exposure assessment is the other principal factor in measuring
risk, and it is the key variable in evaluating the near- and long-term
risks of a specific brownfields site. Reduced exposure is the principal
difference between the risks of a remediated and an unremediated site
2 See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 261, 278, 286-87 (1991).
" For example, as a result of epidemiology studies conducted on miners in the U.S. in
the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission set occupational health standards for radon at 100
picoCuries per liter (pCi/l) of air. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. and Sheryl-Lynn Carof, The LegalControl
ofIndoor Air Pollution, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 247,276 (1998).
' See, e.g., GulfS. Insulation v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th
Cir. 1983) (criticizing use of animal study data).
" E.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding
that the EPA's toxicity evidence supported the prohibition of the discharge of more-chlorinated
PCBs into the nation's waterways even though the dangers posed by less-chlorinated PCBs had
not been conclusively ascertained).
' Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding the EPA
Administrator's determination of ambient air quality standards for lead based on protecting
children from subclinical effects of lead exposure).
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whenever the remedial techniques do not reduce toxicity but simply
isolate (or leave) the existing contamination. The degree of exposure
depends on the amount and location of contamination and the manner
in which the human and ecological receptors are exposed. People are
exposed to contaminated soil, surface water, and groundwater by direct
contact with the skin (e.g., playing in the dirt), by drinking affected
water (e.g., from a well), by ingesting dust (e.g., on food or in the air),
or by inhalation (e.g., breathing in the vicinity). Inhalation, ingestion,
and dermal contact have different risk consequences. Alpha radiation,
for example, is not very dangerous through dermal exposure, because
the skin shields against the relatively large alpha particles; however,
inhalation is extremely dangerous because the lungs are unprotected
from this highly energetic form of radiation. The route of exposure is
critical to determining risk, and to determine this the risk assessor must
trace the toxic material from source to receptor.
The pathway from source to receptor also determines the degree
of exposure. To name some of the more obvious exposure pathways,57
contaminants in the soil at an abandoned industrial site might travel into
groundwater as rain or as run-off that percolates through the soil.
Groundwater is consumed directly, used to wash or irrigate foods, and
used for bathing and showering. Rain and run-off could carry
contamination into surface waters, either directly into a nearby stream
or indirectly through a drainage system. Food crops grown in
contaminated soil and fish living in contaminated surface water can take
up the toxic material and then be ingested by humans. Surface
contaminants or buried contaminants, which have been disturbed by
construction activities, can be inhaled or ingested as dust at or in the
vicinity of the site. And the much-maligned notion of children eating
dirt" is in fact a serious factor in lead absorption in urban areas. A
thorough site risk assessment must therefore consider the locations and
quantities of the contamination, its mobility in the environment, the
" See generally U.S. EPA, RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUPERFUND: HUMAN
HEALTH EVALUATION MANUEL, (Part D), OSWER 9285.7-01D (1998). An example of an
exposure pathway is through fish which play a large role in the diet of some Native Americans.
Kuehn, supra note 46, at 142. For a discussion on the use of religious lands by minorities, see
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION, SCOPING REPORT: NUCLEAR
RISKS IN TRIBAL COMMUNITIES (1995). See also, Robert Charles Ward, The Spirits Will Leave:
Preventing the Desecration and Destruction of Native American Sacred Sites on Federal Land,
19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795 (1992); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-
Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT.
L. REv. 225 (1996).
-1 BREYER, supra, note 40, at 12 (illustrating the problem of regulating "the last ten
percent").
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environmental pathways of human exposure, the routes of internal
exposure (dermal, inhalation, ingestion), and the quantities of human,
exposure (dose). All of these factors are subject to a high degree of
uncertainty, not because they are unknowable, 9 but because of the
volume of required information and the dependence on human behavior
patterns.
The questions of human behavior raise the problem of most
concern to brownfields. To accurately assess the residual risk, one
needs to know how people (or other organisms) will use the
brownfields site in order to determine whether and to what extent they
will come into contact with the contaminants. Brownfields initiatives
have a very specific vision of the future use of the site-i.e., industrial
or commercial use-and this tends to present a fairly low exposure
profile. It has been argued, therefore, that as a matter of common sense
there is little point to assuming greater exposures than are in fact likely,
because it unnecessarily increases the cost and feasibility of
remediation.6° This argument has particular force in the brownfields
context, where opportunities to reduce clean-up expenses are eagerly
sought and industrial or commercial use is the intended result. By
assuming an industrial rather than a residential future for the site,
exposure values decrease substantially.
Another important aspect of exposure is the distribution of
risk."' Risk never shows an even distribution throughout the
population. It decreases as distance from the site increases, for obvious
reasons, and it follows various patterns of contamination and routes of
movement through the environment. Who is or may be in contact with
the contamination? Are they neighbors? Children? Workers? How far
is exposure distributed? What other risks affect the receptors? The full
risk consequences of risk distribution involve both the type of hazard
(e.g., lead is a particular concern for children) and the contribution of
other hazards to which the receptors are exposed.
Numerically, risk characterization, the fourth step in risk
assessment, is simply dose response x exposure. Given all of the
uncertainties and variations in the dose response and exposure
5' An exception at the "micro" level is the translation from external exposure of a person
or other receptor to the internal dose. This requires a great deal of detailed knowledge of the
bioavailability and metabolism of chemicals of concern, much of which either does not exist or
is highly uncertain. This problem, however, is not unique to brownfields risk assessment.
o Douglas J. Sarno, Future Use Considerations in the Cleanup of Federal Facilities,
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS CONTROL, May-June 1993, at 20.
" Kuehn, supra note 46, at 140-43.
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functions, however, a single point estimate is rarely an accurate
reflection of the risk. Moreover, when variability or uncertainty results
in a range of possible values that straddles orders of magnitude--which
is by no means uncommon-there is a real question of what the results
mean. The areas of certainty and uncertainty should be clearly
delineated, assumptions should be disclosed, and proper metrics (e.g.,
individual versus population risk) should be employed. Thus, risk
characterization involves two related problems of expression: how to
be accurate and meaningful to a technical audience that must decide
what to do about the problem, and how to be accurate and meaningful
to a lay audience that is affected by the risk being characterized and
should be allowed to contribute to the decision.
Both aspects of this subject have received a great deal of recent
attention, particularly in regard to communication with the general
public.62 Good risk communication with the public requires, in addition
to the above features, explaining relevant terms and concepts and
placing the results in context. The latter point is highly controversial,
as it involves comparing disparate risks in some fashion, but it is
essential to knowing how seriously a risk should be taken and how
much effort and expense should be expended toward addressing it.63
Comparisons are central to the Brownfields Bargain because the
bargain is a trade-off-development for strict protectiveness-and both
sides of the bargain need to be understood by decision makers and the
affected population. If the idea is to benefit the nearby population, it is
important that it be a benefit to them at a price they can accept.
Before leaving risk assessment, we should consider ecological
risk. Human health is the most familiar and most employed subject of
quantitative risk assessment, but Superfund comprehends "human
health and the environment."' Environmental contamination can have
devastating effects on plant and animal life and habitats (e.g.,
wetlands). The tools for evaluating and characterizing these risks are
far less developed than human health risk assessment, but they contain
essentially the same elements of identifying the non-human receptors
that could be harmed, evaluating the potency of the contaminants, and
6 The importance of good risk communication and stakeholder involvement is
emphasized in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 47, at 23, 37-72.
13 See generally John S. Applegate, Comparative RiskAssessment and Environmental
Priorities Projects: A Forum, Not a Formula, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 71,100 (1997); Adam N. Finkel,
A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the
Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 295,330-331 (1995); Hornstein, supra note 42, at 633.
42 U.S.C. § 9621(b), (d) (emphasis added). CERCLA also provides for "natural
resources damages." § 9607(a)(4)(C), (f).
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measuring the routes and levels of exposure.65 Industrial development
often occurs adjacent to wetlands or bodies of water,66 so a brownfields
risk assessment that fails to make a serious effort to characterize non-
human effects is seriously deficient.
B. The Superfund Time Line
Brownfields sites are physical places, not transient activities;
they cannot simply be stopped or cut back if environmental problems
arise. Also, places have histories and futures, and they are located in a
geographical context or setting. Both of these aspects must be
considered in assessing a site's present and future risks and in decisions
concerning its management. The temporal aspect of "place-ness" can
be represented by the following chart showing the life cycle of a
Superfund or brownfields site:
67
NOW
e-industrial Uncontroled Polluted Present Remediation Foreseeable Long-Term
Use Past Future (-End StewardshlpState')
Background Baseline Risks Transition Risks Target or Long-Term
RmsVkPnsme Residual Risks Risks
In the chart, the Pre-Industrial Use constitutes the period before
industrial activity and its associated chemical risks existed. This is
presumably the risk level indicated by calls to return a site to a
"pristine" condition or to a "background" level of risk. The
Uncontrolled Past includes the industrial activities that led to the
current contamination situation. For brownfields, the important
elements of the past, however, go beyond the nature and the extent of
past activities. They include, for example, the abandonment of the
inner city by industry and the changing economic and demographic
profiles of such areas. The Polluted Present is the current
"' See generally U.S. EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT,
EPA/630/R-92001 (Feb. 1992); U.S. EPA, ROLE OF THE ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE
BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT, OSWER Dir. No. 2985.7-17 (Aug. 1994).
', See, e.g., STANLEY HEDEEN, THE MILL CREEK: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY OF AN
URBAN STREAM 169-75 (1994) (describing the hazardous pollution along a stream that runs
through the industrial area of Cincinnati, Ohio).
7 This is a modified version of John S. Applegate & Steven M. Wesloh, Short
Changing Short-Term Risk: A Study ofSuperfund Remedy Selection, 15 YALEJ. ON REG. 269,275
fig.2 (1998).
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contamination and configuration of the site, i.e., the brownfield itself.
This is the baseline risk posed by the site, and it is the context in which
the Brownfields Bargain is proposed.6' The Remediation Period covers
the time during which the activities that are needed to clean it up to the
applicable standards are performed. These transitional activities pose
their own risks to workers, neighbors, and the natural environment.
With brownfields, the principal concerns with remediation are duration,
cost, and their effect on the attractiveness of redevelopment.
The Foreseeable Future is the target condition of the required
remedial actions. In terms of risk analysis, these are the residual risks
at the site. They ought to be significantly lower than the baseline risks,
but they are also greater than the Pre-Industrial risks. In terms of actual
human activity, this is the period whose characteristics are predicted for
the purpose of establishing clean-up levels. And in terms of
brownfields, this is the period in which redevelopment is to occur as the
result of brownfields incentives. Thus, the Foreseeable Future is the
period in which the key elements of the Brownfields Bargain, the
residual risk and the economic benefits of redevelopment, are realized.
Consequently, much of the discussion of brownfields risk assessment
techniques focuses on this part of the life cycle.
Finally, Long-Term Stewardship reminds us that a place goes
on forever. A decision to leave long-lived contaminants-metals,
radionuclides, elemental contaminants, extremely stable chemicals-in
place means that they must be managed, actively or passively, for an
indefinite period oftime. 9 Such management ("stewardship") can take
many forms, from physical controls to continued monitoring to legal
restrictions on land use, but it must occur in some form. Otherwise, the
site will simply return to a new Uncontrolled Past that needs to be
'There is a lively debate in the environmental justice literature concerning the changes
in the demographics of the areas in which undesirable land uses are located. Some have argued
that these facilities (usually, it should be noted, waste disposal facilities, which are different from
industry in important ways) were originally sited in predominantly minority areas, while others
believe that the present predominance of minorities is the result of poor people moving to cheaper
(because less desirably located) housing. See Vicki Been, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to
the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of EnvironmentalJustice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9-56
(1997); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1383-1406 (1994). Both
scenarios affect brownfields decisions: original unfair siting may produce a demand to remedy the
earlier injustice, and the present location in a poor or minority neighborhood is the basis for
proposing the Brownfields Bargain.
69 See John S. Applegate & Stephen Dycus, Institutional Controls or Emperor's
Clothes? Long-Term Stewardship of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10631 (1998).
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remediated. The long-term future is certainly the impetus behind the
statutory preference for permanent remedies, for treatment, and for
long-term effectiveness. It also responds to the more recently
articulated idea of intergenerational equity, the powerful and well-nigh
inarguable principle that we ought to visit as few of our own sins on our
posterity as possible. However, this time period receives little or no
consideration in brownfields risk assessment, in part because exposure
predictions at that range can be little more than speculation and so of
limited value; in part because redevelopment in the near term is the
central focus of brownfields initiatives; and in part because it is an
inconvenient reminder that the lesser-protection side of the Brownfields
Bargain is sure to extend into the future far longer than the economic
development side can be predicted.
The time periods are interrelated parts of the life cycle of a
Superfund site. The activities in each time period determine the risk
profile of the subsequent periods-or in the case of discontinued
stewardship, return us to an earlier point in the cycle. The risks of the
polluted present determine the remedial needs. What is done and left
undone in remediation determines the risk profile of the foreseeable
future."' If long-lived contaminants are present, decisions not to remove
such materials affect the long-term stewardship period. Nevertheless,
each period also has a distinct risk profile, and each generation inherits
the risks and benefits of the site from the previous generation. To the
extent that redevelopment affects more than one period, those
differences must be accounted for. Each time period affects different
stakeholders in different ways, both positively and negatively. The
risks to the neighboring population of the uncontrolled past and
polluted present create the need for remedial action, the importance of
an economically viable future, and the unfairness of long-term
uncertainty. Intensive remediation creates short-term risks to workers
and neighbors, but it should lower the long-term risks.72 Alternatively,
a decision to isolate existing contamination by placing a building or
parking lot over it may reduce toxic risks for many years, but it may
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, DECIDING FOR THE FUTURE:
BALANCING ROLES, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FAIRLY ACROSS GENERATIONS (1997); EDITH BROWN
WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989).
" James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for
Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573,582-608 (1994). The remediation period is also implicated by
any choice to limit clean-up. However, as a general matter, the less clean-up one does, the lower
the remediation risk. See also Applegate & Wesloh, supra note 67.
72 See Applegate & Wesloh, supra note 67, at 275.
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simply delay from the foreseeable to the long-term future the time when
the contamination leaches into the underlying groundwater. A
foreseeable future with redevelopment may reduce exposure from
contaminants, but may increase other forms of pollution such as air and
water emissions, traffic, and noise.73
The distinct risk profiles are also a function of the "place-ness"
of a Superfund site: the site has neighbors, and the identity of those
neighbors can be important.74 An industrial site is where it is for a
reason, whether it is proximity to other industries, to natural resources,
to transportation, or to employees' homes. Conversely, the neighboring
sites exist where they are for a reason, such as proximity to the industry
that provides them with jobs, customers, suppliers, or any number of
other relationships. Accordingly, one must consider the effects of a
brownfields site on its neighbors. If they are only other factories, then
perhaps one would be less concerned about the risks it imposes because
the receptor humans are exposed for a shorter period of time and there
is no natural setting to be destroyed or repaired. But if, as the core
meaning of brownfields suggests, the factory is in the middle of a poor
residential neighborhood, occupied by persons who are already
subjected to a number of environmental risks (a superhighway nearby,
lead paint in apartments), the significance of additional risks may well
be greater.
Risk assessment, in sum, is an important way to measure and
characterize the risk half of the Brownfields Bargain, both before and
after remediation. Risk assessment helps to understand the nature,
severity, and distribution of the contamination at the existing
abandoned site, and it helps us to project that understanding into the
future to determine residual risks. Risk assessment is central not only
to CERCLA's risk-based remedy selection analysis, but it is also an
essential part of the understanding of the package of risks and benefits
of brownfields redevelopment. It helps to decide, in other words,
whether the Brownfields Bargain is a favorable one for the affected
3 Wemstedt & Hersh, supra note 1, at 165-67.
7' It is odd that this should be news, since even the ancient institutions of trespass and
nuisance law are based on the idea of incompatible neighbors. Cf. R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (describing the reciprocal problems of incompatible uses
of property). Environmental law, by contrast, has tended to look at sources of pollution or
Superfund sites as individual, decontextualized entities. This has obvious advantages for
administration and enforcement purposes, but it is quite unrealistic Brownfields initiatives are
one of several ways in which environmental law is broadening its horizons. Robert Bullard, a
leading environmental justice scholar, emphasizes "the politics of place." BULLARD, supra note
10, at 25.
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persons of today and of the future, and it can provide the basis for
meaningful involvement of the public in these decisions. To
accomplish these functions, brownfields risk assessment must not be a
one-sided analysis, in which the only modifications to the traditional
process are designed to show less risk. Rather, it should be an even-
handed operation, in which risks are realistically calculated, and
uncertainties are candidly acknowledged.
III. RISK-REDUCING MODIFICATIONS
As we have seen, the role of risk assessment in encouraging
brownfields redevelopment is to demonstrate that the present or
foreseeable future risks at a particular site are such that a relatively
limited remedial response is required, and such a showing would
remove or ameliorate an obstacle to redevelopment. Again, the fact that
the effect of these uses of, or modifications to, risk assessment reduces
the calculated hazard does not, in itself, suggest that they are
inappropriate or that they are misuses of risk assessment. If standard
practices unnecessarily" overstate risk, then it is appropriate to modify
them, especially if the practice stands in the way of beneficial
redevelopment. But, we must also be candid about it: the purpose and
effect of the modifications is the lowering of risk estimates for the
purpose of limiting clean-up liability, and so the modifications should
be examined with care.
A. Beyond Unrealistic Assumptions
Coping with uncertainty and lack of sufficient data are
perennial difficulties in risk assessment. Some assumptions have to do
with the toxicity of substances. It is typical, for example, to assume that
a carcinogen has no "threshold" concentration below which it poses no
risk of causing cancer. This assumption may or may not be confirmed
by existing study data, but the existing data are rarely clear in
demonstrating a threshold at very low doses, so the conservative or
"' Conservatism or precaution in the face of uncertainty is not an unnecessary
overstatement in this sense. It is unnecessary if we know better or if the conservatism is adopted
because it is thought to be "costless," that is, there is nothing to be lost by choosing a highly
protective value. In the brownfields context, by hypothesis, the price of unnecessary conservatism
is lack of economic development. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary
Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 851-925 (1996) (criticizing the overuse of precautionary
or conservative assumptions).
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precautionary approach assumes that no threshold exists. Likewise, in
calculating dose, assumptions are made about the conversion factor for
translating the results of animal testing to humans, and, in fact, the use
of animal models at all contains the underlying assumption that they are
relevant to human effects. These kinds of assumptions are scientifically
justified in the sense that there is an empirical or theoretical basis for
them and that there is not a clear demonstration to the contrary, but it
is also a policy choice to adopt, in the face of uncertainty, the
conservative position.76 It is also a policy choice to adopt multiple
conservative assumptions by choosing the conservative assumption
each time an area of uncertainty is encountered. The results of multiple
conservatism, in the view of critics of the practice, render risk
assessments worst-case estimates, which are almost by definition
unlikely to be accurate.77 On the other hand, if we really do not know
what the true values are, it is entirely possible that they are all at the
worst end of the spectrum.78 Moreover, the general policy position of
precaution and protectiveness is one that, in the abstract at least,
Congress and-the general public heartily endorse.79
Toxicity assumptions are used in brownfields risk assessments,
of course, but exposure assumptions are far more important.
Brownfields sites are places, and exposure is a particularly important
variable in remediation techniques that depend on isolation rather than
removal or destruction of hazardous materials. Because of the
complexity and multiplicity of exposure pathways, risk assessors must
make simplifying assumptions. Often these assumptions respond to
uncertainties of the kind addressed in toxicity assumptions, for
example, the rates of inhalation and pulmonary absorption of a
particular chemical while taking a shower. Variability, though, is more
76 
COMMII'EE ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 173-174, app. N-2 (1994).
(explainingjustification for conservative assumptions). For good discussions of conservatism, see
Finkel, supra note 46, at 335-339; Hornstein, supra note 42; Red Book, supra note 43, at 51-85
(discussing the use of"inference guidelines"). For discussion of the reasons for adopting worst-
case or upper-bound estimates, see Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar
Risks, 7 ECOLOGY. L.Q., 207,224-225 (1978).
' See, e.g.. David E. Burmaster & Robert H. Harris, The Magnitude of Compounding
Conservatisms in Superfund Risk Assessments, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 131 (1993) (criticizing risk
assessment as "simplistic policy assumptions" that result in even more conservative risk
assessments).
7s Adam M. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really Too Conservative?: Revising the
Revisionists, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 427 (1989); Adam M. Finkel, A Return to Alchemy, Envtl.
Forum [Envtl. L. Inst.], 15-19 (1996).79See Cross, supra note 75, at 851.
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typical of exposure unknowns. We can test the rate of dermal
absorption of a chemical with some degree of accuracy, but it may turn
out that it differs significantly among individuals or groups of
individuals. Similarly, we can agree that children ingest soil at
playgrounds or that adults drink water from a groundwater source, but
there will be considerable variation in the amount of soil ingested or
water consumed based on the particular habits of each person. The
people themselves vary in size and susceptibility. Such variation
applies to groups, as well. For example, some segments of the
population eat much more fish than others, and so they are exposed to
much higher amounts of toxic chemicals in sediments and surface
waters.
The standard practice in the face of variability is to choose the
conservative or precautionary position, that is, like the toxicity
assumptions, exposure assumptions choose to err (if at all) on the side
of safety by assuming a relatively high degree of exposure to hazardous
substances. Thus, given a range of possible exposure values, the
assessor may choose a point estimate that would protect at least 95 or
99 percent of the population. This is often expressed as the maximally
exposed individual (MEIl), someone whose characteristics are designed
to assure that almost no one could be more exposed in the real world.
The MEI's relevant characteristics include assumptions such as an
occupational or residential use of the site that maximizes contact with
the contamination (farming usually tops the list), behavior patterns
(occasionally bizarre 0) that have the same effect, and a lifetime spent
at the site or its fence line. To the extent that such hypothetical
individuals do not reflect the likely exposure patterns in the foreseeable
and long-term futures, such assumptions have been regularly challenged
as unsuitable to the "just the facts" approach to risk assessment.
This is the heart of the criticism of conservative assumptions:
they are deliberately counterfactual and clearly exaggerate the extent of
the risk. They represent the worst, rather than the expected, case."'
s See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 42, at 1654 (describing the "naked dirt-eating
farmer"); BREYER, supra note 40, at 12 (children eating dirt in the median strip of an interstate
highway).
s Karlin, supra note 33, at 47-49; HAZARDOus WASTE CLEANUP PROJECT,
EXAGGERATING RISK: How EPA's RISK ASSESSMENTS DISTORT THE FACTS AT SUPERFUND SITES
T14ROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES (1993) (recommendations for CERCLA reform by an industry
group).
This is also a strength, of course. As long as the assumptions and exaggerations are
clearly set out, the user of the risk assessment knows that it represents a worst case or upper bound
estimate and can weigh the data accordingly. See Vincent James Cogliano, Plausible Upper
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Deliberate inaccuracy does seem a poor basis for policymaking, even
though protectiveness is clearly a legitimate motivation. Inaccuracy can
also lead to management decisions that are unnecessarily expensive,
which is particularly problematic when dealing with finite resources.
The effect is exacerbated when the conservative assumption is
responsible for cleaning up the "last 10%," the most expensive
increment of contamination.8 2 From a brownfields perspective, this is
a particularly unfortunate consequence of conservatism because it
makes potential clean-up liability that much more daunting a prospect
for potential developers. It also constrains the risk management
decision-whether economic development justifies a lesser level of
environmental protection-by attaching risk assessment values to the
site that make it very difficult to justify taking any but the most
stringent measures. Consequently, brownfields proponents advocate
the use of "best estimates" or average values in making assumptions,
the effect of which would be to lower risk estimates and to reduce
potential clean-up liability. These proposals are usually made in
general terms, applicable to all risk assessments, s3 rather than
specifically to brownfields. But the benefits to brownfields
redevelopment are manifest. Indeed, brownfields proponents and risk
assessment reformers tend to overlap, and brownfields are a frequent
justification for these general risk assessment reforms.
B. Variability and Risk Ranges
Another response to unduly conservative assumptions in risk
assessments is to abandon the practice of using point estimates (i.e., a
single value) in favor of ranges of estimates. While toxicity
assumptions tend to stem from true uncertainties, exposure estimates
tend to yield a range of possible values. Dependent as it is on exposure
assessment, therefore, brownfields risk assessment presents a strong
case for adopting ways of characterizing the spectrum of possible risk
values spectrums that are better than simply choosing a high-end or
upper-bound value.
Bounds: Are Their Sums Plausible?, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 77 (1997).
8 See BREYER, supra note 40, at 12 (citing United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900
F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990), in which a private party litigated to remove a small amount of highly
diluted PCBs and organic compounds at an expenditure of nearly $9.3 million dollars).
s' As part of the Republican "Contract With America," Title III of H.R. 9, discusses risk
assessment. H.R. 9, 104th Cong. (1995); Senate Bill 333 is limited in scope to risk assessment
and the environmental restoration activities of the Department of Energy. S. 333, 104th Cong.
(1995).
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One way to do this is simply to express risk in terms of ranges
rather than particular points. The ranges can be astonishingly broad,
covering multiple orders of magnitude." As a general proposition, it
seems unexceptionable to urge that, if the fullest expression of the
actual risk is that it is a range of risks, a range rather than a point should
be conveyed. Decision makers and the public ought not, in theory at
least, to make important decisions thinking that the risk is one thing
when it might be much higher or lower. From the brownfields
perspective, the specific benefit of presenting a risk range is that it
moderates the impact of worst-case risk estimates. While a range
discloses the upper-bound risk potential, it allows the redeveloper to
argue that the risk may be much lower and at a level that is outweighed
by the benefits of economic development. These arguments mirror the
discussions that surrounded the 1986 revisions of the regulations of the
Council on Environmental Quality concerning the use of worst-case
scenarios in environmental impact statement regulations.' 5 It is
appealing to those whose primary concern is risk reduction to
characterize the debate in terms of the highest possible risk, just as it is
appealing to proponents of redevelopment to minimize risks. However,
as was the case with conservative assumptions, the practice of
managing the relevant information to suggest a particular outcome tends
to replace the real trade-off between environmental and economic
values with apparently dispositive data. If the information is not, in
fact, so definitive, no good reason exists to impose sub rosa a policy
judgment through data presentation.
The disadvantage of risk ranges is that they may also convey
less than is known and thus leave the decision maker or public without
useful guidance. While it may be quite accurate to state that the range
of possible values covers two or more orders of magnitude, what is one
to do with that information? It is a more accurate reflection of a
complex and uncertain reality, but it also makes any decision more
U The difference among the results of different models of dose-response for the familiar
Superfund chemical trichlorethylene (TCE) was memorably described as "not knowing whether
[you] have enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay offthe national debt." C. Richard Cothem
et. al, Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 ENvIL. Sci. & TECH. 111, 115 (1986).
15 51 Fed. Reg. 15618, 15620-24 (1986) (final rule); 50 Fed. Reg. 32234-36 (1985)
(proposed rule); Valerie M. Fogleman, Worst Case Analysis: A Continued Requirement Under
the National Environmental Policy Act?, 13 COLum.J. ENVrL. L. 53, 58 (1987); Charles F. Weiss,
Note, Federal Agency Treatment of Uncertainty In Environmental Impact Statements Under the
CEQ'sAmendedNEPA Regulation§ 1502.22: Worst Case Analysis or Risk Threshold?, 86 MICH.
L. REv. 777 (1988); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen's Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)
(affirming CEQ's rejection of worst case analysis).
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difficult to reach and to justify. A further refinement of risk ranges,
therefore, seeks to assign probabilities to each part of the range. This
can be accomplished through a statistical technique called Monte Carlo
analysis." The known variation in the different components of the risk
calculation are combined repeatedly in random combinations to get a
sense of the most likely final values. The output is a distribution curve
showing the relative likelihood of each of a range of values. This helps
to determine where in the range of possible values the actual exposure
is most likely to lie (or where the 5th, 95th, or 99th percentile lies), but
it does not state that it must lie there. Moreover, a distribution can
reveal the differences among exposures and risks to highly exposed or
highly susceptible populations. This provides more usable information
than a single point (whether it is an upper bound or a median point) or
an undifferentiated range. Several states permit the use of Monte Carlo
analysis in voluntary clean-up programs, and EPA is still in the process
of developing a firm policy on the use of ranges of values and Monte
Carlo analysis.87 In principle, there is nothing intrinsically "low" about
Monte Carlo analysis; as with other proposed modifications to risk
assessment, Monte Carlo analysis is arguably more accurate. But in
application it is advocated as a way to temper upper-bound point
estimates. Like risk ranges, it supports the argument that mere risk
potential should not drive the degree of remediation nor determine the
terms of the Brownfields Bargain.
C. Future Land Use in Remedy Selection
Remedy selection under CERCLA is determined by reference
to the level of residual risk after clean-up activities are complete. Since
exposure is an essential element of any risk calculation, this requires the
risk assessor to make certain assumptions concerning the activities at
the site giving rise to exposure to any remaining hazardous material.
Typically, EPA assumes a relatively intensive use of the site, which
would be expected to result in a high degree of exposure to any
remaining contaminants."8 As with other assumptions, the purpose of
8 For an accessible discussion of Monte Carlo analysis, see Susan R. Poulter, Monte
Carlo Simulation in Environmental Risk Assessment-Science, Policy & Legal Issues, 9 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 7 (1998).
87 U.S. EPA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 3 (March 1997)
EPA/630/R-97/001. See also Poulter, supra note 86, at 17-19.
8' GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-94-144, NUCLEAR CLEANUP:
COMPLETION OF STANDARDS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LAND USE PLANNING ARE UNCERTAIN 13-14
(1994) (quoting Congressional testimony of EPA Deputy Administrator).
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this conservative choice is to assure that actual exposures will be less
and that the public will be better protected. However, the risk assessor
could instead assume less exposure-intensive future uses in order to
lower the calculated residual risk level. Thus, a major innovation in
risk assessment, of importance to brownfields, is the increasing reliance
on limited future uses of the site to justify a less intensive type and
degree of clean-up than would otherwise be required. 9
In order of increasingly likely exposure, the different future use
categories' may be summarized as follows: restricted access
(trespassers only), undeveloped green space, developed park,
commercial/industrial, and residential/agricultural. 9' Agricultural use
of a site involves exposure to the farmer through direct dermal contact
with the soil and groundwater (through drinking or irrigating), extended
opportunities to inhale contaminated dust or volatilized chemicals, and
occasional ingestion either directly or through consumption of dusty
food. Residential use has a roughly similar profile because children
play in their backyards and adults often garden or do repairs. Industrial
or commercial use involves far less potential contact, if only because
the concrete slab of a building and the asphalt of a parking lot insulate
people from most forms of the contamination. The isolation is not
perfect (there are grounds to be mowed and excavations to be
undertaken, and groundwater can still be tapped), but it effectively cuts
off several routes of exposure. Recreational uses of greenspace involve
even less exposure, if only in terms of duration; people (other than
parks department employees) spend far less time at recreational sites
than at work or home. Even within the recreational category, a hiking
trail would involve far less contact with the soil than a baseball
diamond. Finally, a highly restricted land use, in which only trespassers
or occasional monitors would visit the site, would yield a very low
exposure profile, though at the price of permanently underutilized land.
In practice, the great divide in exposure values (and hence risk)
falls between commercial or industrial exposures and residential or
" Arguably, consideration of the future use and existing exposure scenarios (as in
RBCA and TACO, discussed below) provides greater certainty, and certainly-regardless of the
actual requirements-also encourages in redevelopment. Buzbee, supra note 1, at 39-41.
' Future use for the purposes of calculating risk and remedy selection is not the same
as land use planning. Traditional land use planning can be very specific, and it often distinguishes
among types of activities within a given category, such as different types of industry. Likewise,
while industrial and commercial uses have similar risk exposure profiles, they have entirely
different characteristics for the purposes of zoning.
9 See John S. Applegate & Douglas J. Sarno, FUTURESITE: An Environmental
Remediation Game-Simulation, 28 SIMULATION & GAMING 13 (1997).
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
agricultural ones, mostly as a result of differences in duration and
intensity of contact with soil and groundwater. In the context of
Superfund generally, the decision to assess residual risks at the
residential level means that more remedial activity will be required to
meet the risk-based clean-up standards. The impetus for considering
particular future uses was the insight that, although Superfund risk
assessments typically assume an intensive use of the property, like
farming or residence, to achieve a clean-up that is appropriate for all
eventualities, many Superfund sites are industrial areas that have no
apparent prospect of use other than industrial or commercial.' Since
limited uses of that kind limit exposure to contaminated media without
the need for extensive remediation, clean-up activities can bepro tanto
limited. Clean-up to make an industrial site safe for farming, the
thinking goes, is clean-up for its own sake. It is a waste of resources,
and, in the brownfields context, it unnecessarily discourages
redevelopment. Instead, the exposure component of residual risk
should be calculated according to the foreseeable future use of the site.
EPA currently considers future land use in remedy selection under
certain conditions.93 Many states permit this practice in voluntary
clean-up legislation,94 and consideration of future land use is also a
feature of proposed CERCLA reauthorization legislation.9'
The consideration of future use is integral to brownfields
redevelopment for two reasons. First, the whole idea of brownfields
redevelopment is predicated on a specific vision of the future use of the
property. "Redevelopment," after all, means restoring the presumed
future use of the site to an industrial or commercial use.96 Second, that
specific vision of the future use also happens to be a less intensive
future use-industrial as opposed to residential-which results in less
expected exposure, creating a lower residual risk profile. The lower
92 See Sarno, supra note 60; CLEAN SITES, IMPROVING REMEDY SELECTION: AN
EXPLICrT AND INTERACTIVE PROCESS FOR THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM (1990). ROBERT HERSH ET
AL., LINKING LAND USE AND SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: UNCHARTERED TERRITORY (RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE 1996); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BASELINE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT
(BEMR) AT 6-1 to 6-13 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. DOE 1996 BEMR]; U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
CHARTING THE COURSE: THE FUTURE USE REPORT (1996) [hereinafter CHARTING THE COURSE].
93 U.S. EPA, LAND USE IN THE CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS, OSWER
9355.7-04 (May 25, 1995), summarized at 60 Fed. Reg. 29595 (1995).
"' See generally BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3; Schnapf,
supra note 5, at 2488.
95 S. 8, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3000, 105th Cong. (1997).
'9 Redevelopment should include residential development, but industrial and
commercial use provides a larger tax base and it permits less remediation, making it a much more
attractive response to brownfields.
[VOL. 13:2
1997-98] EVALUATING THE BROWNFIELDS BARGAIN 273
risk profile allows the remedy to utilize less intensive measures and to
leave more contamination in place, which is less expensive, which
means less potential liability, and which reduces an obstacle to
brownfields redevelopment.97 Thus, consideration of the foreseeable
future use of the site in the risk assessment process fits hand-in-glove
with brownfields redevelopment initiatives, as it captures the essential
goal of redevelopment and provides a less hostile environment in which
to accomplish it.
D. Rebecca and Taco
Risk-based corrective action-RBCA (pronounced "Rebecca"),
for short-replaces generic clean-up standards with a particularized
evaluation of the risks posed by a specific site. RBCA receives its
name from the corrective action program of RCRA, which for present
purposes is the cognate of the Superfund program for hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities and underground storage
tanks.' In both clean-up programs, one of the principal legal obstacles
to future-use-based remediation targets is the necessity of complying
with the applicable hazardous waste treatment and disposal standards
under RCRA, which apply directly to corrective actions and as ARARs
to CERCLA projects. Since the RCRA requirements are based on
general technical feasibility and are rarely tailored to the site-specific
situation, they do not take limited future exposures into account. Many
complain bitterly about this stringency.9  Such requirements are
incompatible with the special trade-off situation of the Brownfields
Bargain, and to the extent that the generic standards are conservative or
precautionary, they unnecessarily burden the remediation of sites that
pose relatively modest hazards. Unlike traditional approaches to
corrective action that focus on reducing contamination levels below
prescribed numerical standards, the RBCA approach concentrates on a
site's present and potential risks and seeks to reduce risk to an
"acceptable" level of contamination after cleanup based, on expected
' Like a proximate cause problem on a Torts examination, the causal chain from future
use assumptions to redevelopment is lengthy, but it is direct and foreseeable. Therefore, the
adoption of the future use assumption can reasonably be expected to encourage redevelopment,
though the magnitude of the effect surely diminishes with each remove.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(h), 6924(v), 6991(b) (1994).
'9 See Temkin, supra note 33, at 18.
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future land use and exposure pathways.' 0 The result, in theory, should
be more realistic clean-up goals.'
Like future use generally, RBCA seems tailor-made for
brownfields. It moderates the clean-up demands of RCRA and
CERCLA, and it creates a further incentive for commercial or industrial
redevelopment of the site. In both cases, risk assessment is central to
the process. Detailed risk analysis, and in particular exposure
assessment,'0 2 is the technique that not only replaces a generic approach
but also permits the flexibility that the Brownfields Bargain depends
upon. This point could not be clearer in the following table of costs of
remedial actions provided by a RBCA advocate:0 3
Original Remedial Remedial Cost
Site Cost Estimate after RBCA
Pesticide Formulator $40,000,000 So'
Solvent Reoveiy S2.000.000 $0
Wood Treatmenet $1,000,000 so
Fuel Oil Storage $600,000 $100,000
Reftety S2,000.000 $50000
Clearly, for brownfields purposes, this reduction in potential liability is
central to encouraging redevelopment.
One drawback of RBCA is the relatively large expense involved
in performing a detailed, site-specific, risk-based analysis instead of a
generic one, because risk assessment is not cheap.' °5 Enter the so-called
Tiered Approach to Corrective Action Objectives (TACO, pronounced
'o Gerald W. Phillips, Rethinking Restoration: Risk Based Corrective Action and the
Future of Economic Regulation, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 659, 665 (1996).
tot For thorough and enthusiastic discussions of RBCA, see James R. Rocco & Lesley
Hay Wilson, The Risk-Based Corrective-Action Process, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE, supra note 3, at 250-67; James P. O'Brien, The Tiered Approach to Corrective Action
Objectives and the Site Remnediation Program in lllinois, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10611
(1997); Michael L. Gargas & Thomas F. Long, The Role of Risk Assessment in Redeveloping
Brownfields Sites, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 214-249. See
also Phillips, supra note 100; Joseph J. Saga, Risk-Based Cleanup of Contaminated Property, 58
J. ENVL. HEALTH 18 (1996); Charan J. Johl et al., Metals-Laden Soils: Put Risk-Based
Remediation to Work, 1 ENVTL. ENGINEERING WORLD 20 (1995).
t52 See Rocco & Wilson, supra note 101, at 261-65.
103 Gargas & Long, supra note 101, at 227 tbl.2.
'o The zero represents the adoption of a "no-action" alternative for clean-up. Id.
I051d. at 225-26 (asserting that the "greater initial cost [ofperforming a risk assessment]
is more than offset by the cost savings in time and money required to gain a release from future
regulatory action").
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"taco"). In this approach, increasingly detailed levels of risk
assessment are undertaken when the more generic assumptions are
thought to overstate actual or expected site conditions. In other words,
if generic assumptions demonstrate little or no need to undertake
remedial activities, then the redeveloper would use them. If, however,
they do not demonstrate little or no need to undertake remedial
activities and a more detailed analysis would ameliorate the generic
requirements, then the further analysis should be undertaken.
6
Proponents of TACO have identified a number of tiers of analysis. Tier
1 analysis involves the implementation of generic cleanup objectives
based on conservative risk assessment assumptions. Tier 2 requires
site-specific cleanup objectives derived from published formulae and
data pertaining to the particular site. If neither tier I nor tier 2 is
appropriate to site conditions, then tier 3 analysis, which requires that
all the formulae and data be taken from site-specific information and
that only the "most likely" exposure scenarios be analyzed, can be used
to determine "appropriate and cost-effective remedies."'
0 7
The purpose of TACO is the familiar one of achieving a more
accurate or precise estimate of the initial or residual risks associated
with a site. The effect is familiar, as weU: to avoid less costly clean-
up. TACO takes a step closer than RBCA, future use, and adjusted
assumptions to the unabashed manipulation of data to achieve a desired
conclusion, because its implementation is tied directly to the
redeveloper's satisfaction with the results of the risk analysis and not
to a more apparently objective criterion like actually expected future
use. As Robert Kuehn has observed, in a slightly different context:
"The message could not be clearer-why invest in pollution prevention
and long-term environmentally sustainable technologies when one can
simply develop lower risk assessment numbers."'0" On the other hand,
TACO can also be viewed as a straightforward application of value-of-
information principles, which caution against the use of analytical
techniques whose cost outweighs the marginal utility of the additional
knowledge thereby obtained.'0 9 Attempting precision in risk assessment
106 A similar tiered system is in place for the decommissioning of civilian nuclear
facilities. Depending on the ability to achieve certain residual levels of public exposure to
radioactivity, the site is designated for either unrestricted or restricted future uses. 10 C.F.R.§§
20.1402-20.1403 (1998). However, where such levels are unachievable, the applicant may adopt
an "alternative" level of exposure if specified conditions are met. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1404 (1998).
'o7O'Brien, supra note 101, at 10612-14; Rocco & Wilson, supra note 101, at 257.
0' Kuehn, supra note 46, at 168.
'09 See HOwARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES
UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968); see also Applegate, supra note 42, at 1648-49.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L.
is of little value if it will make little difference to the regulatory
outcome; conversely, seeking precision makes sense if it will save
money in the long run. In the latter event, TACO appropriately serves
the goals of brownfields redevelopment.
E. Risk Comparisons
Proposed risk reform legislation would require EPA to include
in its analysis of proposed rules a comparison of the assessed risks of
the activity with "other reasonably comparable risks familiar to and
routinely encountered by the general public."'1 0 The purpose of such
comparisons is to place the cancer risks of toxic chemicals in
perspective by relating them to activities like driving, swimming,
waking up in the morning, and so on."' Numerous commentators have
advocated risk comparison as an antidote to what they perceive as
irrational fears of trivial hazards."' For brownfields purposes, risk
comparisons are often used to minimize the significance of the baseline
and residual risks at a site, from which the public or decision maker is
to infer that less intensive remedial action is needed. One description
of risk assessment, in the brownfields context, begins with a chart of
risks of death from such diverse sources as heart disease, murder,
electrocution, tornados, and meteors.' Unfortunately, much of the
comparative data is of questionable accuracy, rendering the "context"
created thereby unreliable." 4  More fundamentally, many of these
comparisons are simply tendentious. The risks have nothing to do with
each other, they arise from different sources, and they are characterized
by wildy different levels of voluntary acceptance, familiarity,
"0 S. 98 1, as amended by S. Arndt. 1644 (Feb. 4, 1998) § 624(g). Remediation projects
are not "rules" within the meaning of the statute, but the requirement for comparisons could be
expanded to include them.
. BREYER, supra note 40, at 34. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 41.
"' See Cross, supra note 75, at 900-906; RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 41, at 16-17;
W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 12-13 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi,
FATAL TRADE-OFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIE FOR RISK (I 992): BREYER, supra note
40.
" Gargas and Long, supra note 101, at 215 tbl.1.
" See Gerrard, supra note 12, at 727-28 (criticizing the adequacy of data underlying
a frequently relied upon table of comparative risks). A similar inquiry into a similar table of
comparative regulatory costs resulted in a similar finding that the underlying data were similarly
deficient. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981
(1998).
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controllability, and associated benefits, all of which are highly relevant
to understanding and managing risk.'
Some comparisons are useful, however. As noted above in
connection with the Superfund life cycle, the actual remediation
activities at a site impose their own risks, some of which are quite high
relative to the underlying toxic risks of the site. In particular,
remediation risks center on the site itself and its immediate
surroundings-a consequence of the "place-ness" of a Superfund site.
The greater the remediation effort, the greater the remediation risks to
the site's neighbors from, for example, transportation and contaminated
dust." 6 Therefore, regardless of redevelopment plans, clean-up
decisions should take into account the harms of the remedy itself.
While it is impossible to devise a simple formula for such a
comparison,"' it is certainly a legitimate consideration in determining
the type and extent of the remedy. To the extent that such comparisons
would tend in practice to limit rather than expand remediation
requirements, they may be attractive to brownfields developers.
A less modest use of risk comparison would consider the risk-
reducing effects of redevelopment. First, a redeveloped area (at least
in the core sense ofbrownfields redevelopment, discussed at the outset)
would presumably be a "nicer" area because it is less blighted with
abandoned buildings and uncontrolled contamination. The residents
would have more money as the result of direct employment in the
redevelopment effort or indirectly from renewed economic activity in
the area. Infrastructure could be restored, more new businesses would
enter the local market, and gainfully employed persons would come to
dominate the tone of the place-the litany of benefits of revitalization
is familiar. This transformation should reduce the risks to the persons
in the area by reducing the risk of being injured by crime. Crime is, of
course, a mortality risk, and the reduction of this risk would be a
genuine improvement in quality of life. Revitalization would also
.. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
Cti. L. REv. 1,43-66 (1995); Hornstein, supra note 42, at 584-616; Clayton P. Gillette & James
E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1070-85 (1990).
"6 Applegate & Wesloh, supra note 67, at 319-23; see also U.S. DOE 1996 BEMR,
supra note 95, at 6-13 (discussing Oak Ridge Reservation).
"' This is in part because the risk data are rarely that precise (as we have seen), and in
part because there are many other factors at work that make a direct comparison of short-term
clean-up risk and long-term public risk a treacherous business. See Applegate & Wesloh, supra
note 67.
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reduce "urban ecological" risks"' by analogy to the natural ecological
risks discussed above. To be sure, aspects of community life like
feeling secure, neighborliness, and attractiveness of surroundings are,
like their natural counterparts, difficult to quantify, but they contribute
strongly to the improvements that would occur as a neighborhood
became "nicer" in much the way that clean-up makes a natural
environment more desirable.
Secbnd, wealth can reduce many risks to human health.
Poverty is very risky because of poor living conditions, poor nutrition,
poor access to medical care, and the severe stresses of having no
economic security." 9 Some scholars have tried to quantify the
components and overall effect of this otherwise fairly obvious point.
Some have even calculated mortality effects of loss of income from the
cost of the Superfund program. 2 The number of assumptions and
generalizations that underlie such precise conclusions are truly heroic,
but the underlying point is undoubtedly valid that, all other things being
equal, significantly improving people's economic status will enable
them to reduce numerous risks to their lives and health.
The reasoning behind the redevelopment-as-risk-reduction
argument, then, is that redevelopment improves the risk profile of those
who are benefitted by it; therefore, the Brownfields Bargain is likely to
be a good deal for them even if less environmental protection is
required. This reasoning, obviously, compares very different kinds of
risks (crime versus chemicals), and it may only restate the truism that
it is beneficial to have more money. Nevertheless, this argument
directly responds to the concern that all of the other risk assessment
modifications that the Article has discussed have the effect of allowing
higher residual risks than would otherwise be permitted. It replies that,
even if the Brownfields Bargain means a higher residual risk,
'I Cf Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the aesthetic and
quality-of-life aspects of a neighborhood are environmental impacts within the meaningofNEPA);
CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, CALIFORNIA EPA, TOwARD THE 21ST CENTURY:
PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA's ENVIRONMENT (May 1994) (incorporating
quality of life concerns in its ranking of risks).
"' See Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk Reduction: Promises and Pifalls, 3 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 255,278-283 (1995);FrankB. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: the Role
of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729,730-40(1995). These risks, of course, overlap
to some degree with the risks of crime, discussed above.
20 Viscusi, supra note 112, at 12-13. Viscusi and Zeckhauser assert that all risk
regulation has this risk-creating effect, since in his view all risk regulation decreases social wealth
by the costs of its implementation. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Fatality and
Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 19, 19, 21, 36-39 (1994).
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redevelopment is still a net reduction in risk because of the risk-
reducing effects of increased wealth and more attractive surroundings.
IV. NEW APPLICATIONS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
While brownfields proponents often look to risk assessment for
relief from environmental burdens on redevelopment that they regard
as unnecessary, risk assessment, like all procedures, is and should be a
double-edged sword. In Part III, we examined a number of aspects of
the risk assessment process that tend to support redevelopment by
reducing the calculated risks. In this part, we examine a number of
ways in which risk assessment can be used to better reveal the true
terms of the Brownfields Bargain. In some cases, these aspects of risk
assessment tend to suggest greater risks, and in others they highlight
uncertainties in the predictions that underlie the risk calculations.
A. Cumulative Exposures
That a brownfields site is a place has, as we have seen, several
consequences for the exposure elements of its risk profile. There are
also important toxicity consequences. Unlike a particular industrial
process or point source of pollution, an industrial site is likely to pose
multiple toxic threats.121 Currently, toxicology does not understand
with any certainty the cumulative effects of multiple toxic exposures.'
22
The effects may be additive, synergistic (i.e., having a combined effect
greater than the added effect of both), or even antagonistic (in effect
canceling out each other). While synergy is seen in some settings, for
example the combined effect of asbestos exposure and cigarette
smoking being five times greater than either alone, 123 addition of risks
is the normal assumption, but only because there is usually little basis
for adopting any particular alternative.' 24 The result is that a
21 The air and water emissions of a factory taken as a whole can be quite numerous.
Indeed, one of the principal objections to the "bubble" concept in controlling air pollution is the
difficulty of evaluating the cumulative effects of such sources. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,847-848 (1984) (describing environmentalists'
objections). Congress explicitly approved such an approach, however, in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (a)(1-4) (1994).
122 Kuehn, supra note 46, at 121.
123 AGENCY FOR ToxiC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, CASE STUDIES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE: ASBESTOS ToxICITY 4 (1990).
"2 Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the
Problem of Causation? 7 HIGH. TECH. L.J. 189, 233 (1992); Scott C. Whitney, SuperfundReform:
Clarification of Cleanup Standards to Rationalize the Remedy Selection Process, 20 COLUM. J.
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brownfields site presents a suite of environmental insults to its risk
receptors, and the effects of that combination are poorly defined.
As a place, a brownfields site has neighbors. Since the typical
brownfields area is a formerly industrial area that shows promise for
redevelopment, its neighbors often include other industrial sites that
pose similar contamination and pollution problems. For residential
neighbors, this possibility raises the spectre of multiple threats to their
health. Toxic pollution control legislation is only now beginning to
come to grips with the problem of cumulative impacts on particular
populations, 2 ' and EPA recently published guidance on cumulative risk
assessment.'26 The guidance itself, and the growing interest in
cumulative exposures, are in a large part responses to the environmental
justice concerns of highly impacted communities.'27 From this
perspective, indeed, brownfields neighbors may be seen as extra-
sensitive risk receptors, in the sense that they are exposed to numerous
sources of environmental risk from industrial and transportation
sources.' In radiological health terms, they already have a high body
burden of toxic risk, so the cumulative effects are likely to be quite
high. There is, accordingly, an urgent need to understand better the
combined impact of many sources of environmental risk, one of which
is the site to be redeveloped, in assessing brownfields risks.
B. The Perils of Prediction
While uncertainty inheres in many aspects of our understanding
of the current risk picture, it is inevitably more pronounced when we
attempt to extrapolate into the future, especially the more distant future.
The characterization of future exposures, which is central to all
exposure assumptions and analyses for brownfields redevelopment, is
necessarily an exercise in prediction, and predictions can be faulty on
two counts: expectations and control.
ENVTL. L. 183,219 (1995).
'25 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (a)(l)(1994) ("toxic hot spots" under the Clean Water Act);
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (f)(1)(C)(1994) (cumulative effects under the Clean Air Act).
126 U.S. EPA, SCIENCE POLICY COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON CUMULATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT. PART 1. PLANNING AND SCOPING (1997).
127 Kuehn, supra note 46, at 106; Ferris, supra note 13. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,898,
3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) ("Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations").
... Kuehn, supra note 46, at 118-124; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as
Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107 (1993).
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Expectations of what will in fact occur at some point in the
future can be flawed. Local and regional planning boards regularly
make general predictions of land uses in the near-term future for a
variety of purposes, and they are clearly not infallible. Yet, brownfields
redevelopment depends on accurately forecasting a specific use
(industrial or commercial) for a specific site. The actual realization of
such predictions can be encouraged, of course, with incentives like
lowering taxes or relaxing clean-up requirements. Even so, predictions
are hardly guarantees, because much more than financial and
environmental incentives goes into industrial and commercial siting
decisions. Therefore, a brownfields risk assessment must disclose to
decision makers and to the public the basis for and the weaknesses in
its assumption of an industrial or commercial future, as it should with
other assumptions and extrapolations. 2 9
In addition to incentives, more aggressive measures can be
designed to encourage desired uses or to discourage undesirable ones.
If the risk assessment underlying a brownfields project assumes that the
site will not be used for residential purposes or that the existing
contamination will remain isolated from the general public, the only
way to have any real confidence that this future will come to pass is for
"institutional controls" to be imposed. Institutional controls are active
efforts to isolate residual contamination or to mandate or prohibit
certain future uses. Legal controls include public ownership,
notification, deed restrictions, zoning, and other land use controls.
130
Physical controls include permanent structures, barriers, and engineered
disposal facilities.13 ' So, for example, a redeveloping community
cannot simply advertise the availability and affordability ofbrownfields
lands to encourage industrial use, but the community must also zone it
to exclude the considerably more exposure-intensive residential or
agricultural uses. Though EPA's approach to institutional controls is
.29 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 79-
242,351-354 (1994); PRESIDENTIAI/CONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supra note 47, at iii-iv, 63-101.
"I John Pendergrass, Use of Institutional Controls as Part of a Superfund Remedy:
Lessons From Other Programs, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10109 (1996); HERSH ET AL.,
supra note 92, at 65-94; Susan C. Borinsky, The Use ofInstitutional Controls in Superfund and
Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1995); David F. Coursen, Institutional Controls
at Superfund Sites, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10279 (1993); Anne D. Weber, Institutional
Controls-An Expedited and Cost-Effective Means for Returning a Superfund Site to Beneficial
Use, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 461 (1993-94); George Wyeth, Land Use and Cleanups:
Beyond the Rhetoric, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst) 10358 (1996); Krista J. Ayers, Comment,
The Potentialfor Future Use Analysis in SuperfundRemediation Programs, 44 EMORY L.J. 1503,
1523-38 (1995).
' Karlin, supra note 33, at 49.
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guarded,'32 the states already and increasingly rely on the deployment
of institutional controls to meet risk targets in voluntary, brownfields,
and even involuntary, state-led clean-up programs. 1
33
While planning predictions, incentives, and institutional
controls can be fairly reliable in the foreseeable future (especially with
respect to the first post-remediation developer) the Superfund life cycle
reminds us that our concerns do not end there. Many hazardous
materials will remain in existence indefinitely. The appropriateness of
future use and RBCA as justifications for less intensive clean-up
depends absolutely on the long-term operation of institutional controls,
and yet the long-term efficacy of such measures is extremely
problematic.' There is very little experience with the actual long-term
integrity and efficacy of physical controls like disposal facilities or
markers, to say nothing of the arrangements for monitoring and
repairing them. Legal controls like zoning are highly changeable, and
deed restrictions are difficult to enforce. Underlying the problem with
institutional controls is the difficulty of transmitting information about
the hazards of residual contamination or disposal structures over long
periods of time.
To evaluate adequately the reliability of such predictions and
controls, a decision maker and affected persons must at least know the
precise expected future use and the basis for the prediction; the degree
of confidence in predictions and the basis therefor; the exact nature of
and responsibility (including financial responsibility) for the
institutional controls and their enforcement; and how restrictions and
obligations are to be documented, recorded, and communicated to
future generations. While some of this information may seem far afield
from traditional risk assessment, candor requires some discussion of
these issues to the extent that the brownfields analysis relies on
assumptions regarding the future. It is a poor general policy to
unwittingly create a "turnstile" brownfields program in which clean-up
is really merely deferral. A turnstile program would also be a particular
injustice to nearby neighborhoods, which would be subjected to a cycle
' 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(I)(iii) (1997); U.S. EPA, LAND USE IN THE CERCLA
REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS, OSWER 9355.7-04 (May 1995).
' See ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
OFFICIALS, SURVEY OF STATE INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS (Dec. 1997); BROWNFIELDS:
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3, at 287-681; Schnapf, supra note 5, at 2488, 2496.
134 HERSH ET AL., supra note 92; Coursen, supra note 130, at 10280; Wernstedt &
Hersh, supra note 1, at 171-72; Applegate & Dycus, supra note 69.
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of hazardous environmental releases, dangerous clean-ups, and
industrial pollution.
Risk assessment is a double-edged sword: if conservative
assumptions are to be analyzed and replaced where unsupported,
ameliorative assumptions should be subject to similar scrutiny. The
predictions of the future state of the site go to the heart of the
Brownfields Bargain. The exchange of economic value to the
community for greater residual risk affects not only the present
residents of the area, but also future generations who will inherit the
exchange. We cannot very well ask our descendants for their opinion
on the appropriateness of the bargain, but at least we can assure
ourselves that they too would regard it as a good deal.'
35 Risk
assessment is the primary framework for this evaluation; if the
comparison cannot validly be made, then it calls into question the
confidence we should have in the bargain in the first place.
C. Stakeholder Involvement
Stakeholder involvement is increasingly recognized as essential
to the CERCLA clean-up process and to risk assessment generally. It
is especially important to the Brownfields Bargain where one is dealing
with a place-a locality with neighbors-and the potential health
effects are focused on them.'36 In a democratic society the exchange
between economic development and risk should not simply be imposed
from above. 37 Moreover, because brownfields are often located in
areas that have a history of environmental mistreatment and political
and economic underrepresentation, brownfields redevelopment raises
"'See Jeffrey Spear, Note, Remedy Selection UnderCERCLA andOur Responsibilities
to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117, 136-144 (1993) (advocating consideration of
future generations in CERCLA remedy selection decisions).
36 This is not, however, the view of the Ohio legislature, which, as noted above, saw
fit to allow citizens to be placed at greater risk without their knowing or being able to find out
about it. See note 37, supra.
"' Former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus was presented with the decision
whether to impose strict air pollution limitations that would close a huge smelter in Tacoma,
Washington, seriously harming its economic base, or whether to permit modified operation. He
chose to let the residents of the Tacoma area make that choice between economic well-being and
risk. ROBERT B. REICH, THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS (1988); Robert B. Reich, Public
Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985).
Other reasons for stakeholder involvement, including improved information gathering,
are developed in Frances M. Lynn, Public Participation in Risk Management Decisions: The
Right to Define, the Right to Know, and the Right to Act, I RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 95
(1990); PRESIDENTIAIJCONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supra note 47, at 79-82; Applegate, supra note
36, at 947-51.
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fairness or environmental justice concerns that can only be addressed
through a public process that involves the affected persons.
138
Specifically, the neighbors of a brownfields site are the persons whom
the Brownfields Bargain is intended to benefit, and they should be
involved in all aspects of the decision to pursue the proposed
redevelopment.' 39
Risk assessment can be a tool for evading public involvement
by recasting political questions as technical ones and by privileging
technical tools to which communities have limited access. 40  The
emerging view of risk assessment as a tool for public participation as
well as for technical analysis can reverse this effect. As is detailed in
the recent reports of the National Academy of Sciences and the
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management,' 4' brownfields risk assessors should deploy an approach
to risk assessment that is broadly inclusive, that invites public
participation throughout the process, and that is integrated into
decisionmaking. New public participation techniques, such as citizens
advisory boards, can be added to existing review-and-comment
procedures and technical assistance grants to make meaningful public
participation a reality.'42 Risk assessment provides a framework for
gathering and presenting the information that the public and decision
makers need to make good brownfields decisions. Ifthere is a tendency
to overlook environmental protection in the enthusiasm for
redevelopment,'43 risk assessment can also help to restore some balance
to consideration of the Brownfields Bargain.
D. Risk Distribution and Environmental Justice
The Brownfields Bargain is a specific trade-off between an
environmental risk and an economic benefit. In many ways, this is
simply a variation of the fundamental policy question in all
3 These issues are thoroughly discussed in Engel, supra note 13.
139 McWilliams, supra note 10, at 705-783; Ferris, supra note 13.
'oKuehn, supra note 46, at 129-39.
"'PRESIDENTAIJCONGRESSIONAL COMM'N, supra note 47 ; UNDERSTANDING RISK,
supra note 47; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING CONSENSUS THROUGH RISK
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (1994).
' Applegate, supra note 36.
14' This phenomenon was observed in Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 1, at 169-70. As
a general matter, local governments are for a variety of reasons more directly motivated by
development than environmental health concerns.
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environmental regulation: "whether the statistical possibility of future
deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of
preventing those deaths."' It is undoubtedly the case that in many
instances the incremental environmental benefits of a clean-up under
the ordinarily applicable CERCLA requirements do not justify the lost
opportunity for economic redevelopment. The underlying assumption
behind this comparison of environmental risks and economic benefits,
however, is that the risk receptors and economic beneficiaries are
either the same group of people or they overlap to a substantial degree.
In its core meaning, the Brownfields Bargain is predicated on an
exchange by inner city brownfields neighbors of environmental
protection for economic improvement in those areas. 4" The
Brownfields Bargain is a good deal only if those who are accepting the
reduced environmental protection also see the economic benefits; it is
a bad deal if the same inner city neighborhood, which is already
suffering from abandoned industries, must sit by as workers and
shoppers from elsewhere drive in and out of the redeveloped facility.4 6
Discussions of environmental justice frequently comment on
lack of symmetry between the economic and environmental benefits and
burdens of industrial activity. As Richard Lazarus states, "identical
recipients are rarely, if ever, the result."'4 7 Brownfields are, in fact, a
cousin of the familiar compensated siting plans that have been advanced
as a way to find locations for locally unwanted land uses.' When it is
simply a matter of compensation for siting, it has not been very
successful.'49 Moreover, compensated siting has been controversial
because it raises the moral question of the appropriateness of trading
'" Industrial Union Dept, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)(the Benzene case). Careful risk assessment may also be
important to ensure that minority environmental risk concerns are not overlooked, Kuehn, supra
note 46, at 160-66.
141 It is unfortunately true, however, that in many cases the commitment to improving
the lot of the neighbors is largely rhetorical, and that the main reason for the redevelopment is to
benefit the tax base and the developers. The view taken here is that brownfields promoters should
be held to their rhetoric.
" In the Industri-Plex situation, for example, one town would receive the economic
benefit of redevelopment, while the adjacent town would receive the bulk of the traffic problems.
Wemstedt & Hersh, supra note 1, at 17 1.
14' Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice ": The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787, 792 (1993).
14' There is enormous literature on compensated siting plans. It is conveniently
summarized in Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21
FoRDAm URB. L.J. 787, 792 (1994).
... Id at 823-25.
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environmental protection for economic redevelopment.15 Where the
community to be compensated is poor, as in the core brownfields
context, the voluntariness of the consent to the bargain has been
questioned. People who are unemployed will feel compelled to prefer
jobs to the environment."'
Risk assessment can be used to highlight the risks to workers
and the immediate neighborhood of extensive remediation activities;
that is, it can focus attraction on distributional as well as clean-up
issues.'52 For example, capping and leaving contamination in place, a
typical redevelopment-friendly remedy selection, would produce far
less dust and truck traffic than excavating and hauling away large
volumes of contaminated material. The argument can be made, based
on this observation, that the incremental risks of more intensive
remediation and the economic benefits to be obtained from
redevelopment outweigh the higher residual risk from the
contamination remaining in place. This argument has some force
because the risks of the remedy tend to focus on the immediate
neighborhood, and economic benefit may well tip the balance in favor
of trading off short-term economic gain against long-term
environmental risks-if a share of the benefits are obtained by the
immediate neighborhood. Likewise, the risk benefits of economic well-
being may outweigh the risk detriment of contamination remaining in
place-again, if the risk receptors and economic beneficiaries are the
same. Without a substantial overlap of receptors and beneficiaries,
brownfields redevelopment may benefit the redeveloper and may
benefit the city's tax base, but it is no more than a cynical scheme to
lower environmental standards, externalize environmental costs, and
impose them on the already disadvantaged inner city.
The provision of better information about environmental effects
is universally recommended as one remedy for environmental justice
because better information would both highlight the existence of a
problem and provide the basis of remedial legal or political action by
'm Id. at 787 & nn. 3-4.
... See BULLARD, supra note 10, at 68-70 (explaining the relative lack of concern over
the environmental consequences of potential development in Houston's African-American business
community); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND
RACE 7 (1987) (expressing concern that "Many racial and ethnic communities have highly
depressed economies and alarming unemployment rates, they would be particularly vulnerable.").
152 Kuehn, supra note 46, at 140-43; see also Lazarus, supra note 147, at 843-48
(recommending that agencies be required to take risk distribution into account).
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the affected community.153 Executive Order 12898, in fact, requires the
development of information about "disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of [federal] programs, policies,
and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.""
' 4
In the brownfields context, if such bargains are to occur, the trade-offs
need to be better understood. 5' We saw in the RBCA and TACO
context that a more complete or sophisticated risk assessment could
facilitate redevelopment by moderating clean-up requirements.
Completeness and sophistication should work both ways: abrownfields
risk assessment should consider not only total risks, but also their
distribution in the population. Risk assessment, of course, has no direct
role in assuring that the neighbors of a brownfields site receive benefits
through increased employment and improved living conditions.
However, by identifying the risk receptors with care, it can point out the
need to assure an equitable distribution of risks and benefits.
V. CONCLUSION: RISK ASSESSMENT IS NOT CLEAN-UP
Good reasons exist to modify risk assessments that are
unrealistically conservative and unnecessarily impede brownfields
redevelopment. If risk is the fundamental standard for clean-up
requirements and if risk assessment is the technique for measuring
compliance with or deviance from that standard, then redevelopment
decisions should be based on reasonable estimates of reasonably
expected risks, allowing for a duly precautionary approach to
uncertainties. If the result of these modifications to risk assessment
practices is the revitalization of urban brownfields, so much the better.
But we must remember that risk assessment is no more than a method
for calculating compliance with clean-up standards. It is not, as some
would have it, a clean-up technology. Actual remediation
activities-whether they are strictly necessary or not, whether they pass
the point of diminishing returns or not, whether they impose undue
remedial risks or not, whether they scare off potential developers or
not--do improve the environment at a Superfund site; they provide
environmental protection. The lower estimates of a recalculated risk
... One of the earliest studies of environmental injustice emphasized the importance of
better environmental information, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, supra note 151, at 7, 24-27; see
also Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and
"Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 289-98 (1997); Lazarus, supra note 147, at 826-27.
ts' Exec. Order 12,898, supra note 127, at §§ 1-101 - 1-103, 3-301.
"' Been, supra note 148.
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assessment, by contrast, are only valid as long as the assumptions and
predictions turn out to be accurate. Moreover, as was discussed in
connection with the TACO approach to risk assessments, the idea that
risk assessment can substitute for clean-up simply breeds the suspicion
that all of the risk assessment techniques for facilitating brownfields
redevelopment are no more than torturing the proverbial statistics until
they tell you what you want to hear.
In the final analysis, risk assessment is nothing more than a
valuable tool that helps to make important decisions with environmental
consequences. As such, its function is limited to providing useful
information to aid in making decisions. It does not make the decisions,
and it does not protect people from environmental hazards. Faced with
the high cost of environmental clean-up generally, in particular with the
desire to reduce the obstacles to redevelopment of the inner city, it is
tempting to view recalculation as a solution, in effect eliminating the
problem of environmental contamination. But it does no such thing.
Risk assessment, instead, should try to tell us the truth about a given
situation; it should be a double-edged sword. It is entirely appropriate
that risk assessment avoid unrealistic assumptions and that it account
for predictions of the future based on economic redevelopment. But it
must also disclose the rest of the Brownfields Bargain, that some
persons will be placed at a higher risk than they would under non-
brownfields circumstances and that predictions of the future are in the
nature of assumptions whose validity must be carefully justified. In
some cases, the Brownfields Bargain will be a good deal. In other
cases, though, a candid risk assessment will show that the long-term
risks of leaving contamination in place are too high, too uncertain, or
too inequitably distributed to be a responsible bargain for present and
future generations.
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